Would it really be too far to argue
that corporations should not have rights? More specifically, I would
like to argue that corporate persons do not have rights on par with
natural persons. I don't think this is really all that implausible.
First and foremost, let's think about why natural persons have rights
(when they do). The general trend among democratic theorists is to
argue that rights claims among democratic citizens arises from
something like mutual consent and recognition of one another as
autonomous agents. I'm an autonomous agent, and you're an autonomous
agent. If we're going to maintain that autonomy and cooperate, we
should guarantee one another that we'll respect one another's
autonomy. A system of rights is established that guarantees that we
can each do as we please as long as we don't interfere with anyone
else doing the same.
It's a nice fairytale, and it can be
told through the lens of game theory, mutually uninterested
contractors, or deliberative rational agency. Kant tells something
like this story, as does Mill. Rawls draws his version from both of
them. Habermas also tells it. Honestly, despite my usual skepticism
of often-told tales, I like this one. Even if it is not a fully
accurate description, it sets out a norm that democratic societies
should adopt. Democratic citizens should recognize
themselves as free, autonomous agents consenting to live among other
agents through mutual recognition of that status.
Corporate
entities are a different story. They are created as legal fictions to
serve the ends of citizens. Insofar
as a corporate entity is recognized as a person, it is to allow it to
own property, establish
credit, and absorb risk for the sake of its human managers,
investors, and employees. At the end of the day, a corporate entity
is made to serve a person, not the other way around. We
do not recognize corporations as autonomous because they are not
autonomous in either a strong or weak sense. Corporations do not make
decisions. People make decisions and execute them through the
corporation. Furthermore,
corporate entities are incapable of recognizing their own autonomy or
the autonomy of other agents. Corporate
entities do not have the
capacity for reflection or self-development that natural persons do.
As such, they are unsuitable
vehicles for rights, entirely
unlike natural persons in the relevant capacities.
Nevertheless,
we recognize that corporations can have property rights, can
establish and maintain formal
relationships (ie, client-vendor accounts), and,
most crucially, operate businesses. These
rights arise from a formal granting by natural persons. The
legal fiction is established and recognized because the institution
of corporate entities hold advantages for citizens. In
other words, corporate rights are parasitic on the rights of natural
persons. The rights of natural persons arise from mutual recognition
as autonomous agents. One set
of rights claims is prior to
other, so they should not be
treated as on par.
The
result is a simple maxim: when considering the rights of natural
persons, corporate entities must be treated as having no rights. We
can say that natural persons who are stakeholders in the corporation
have rights, and they likely also have attendant interests that
should be respected. Nevertheless, the corporate entity itself
has no rights claims with any value when the rights of a natural
person are at stake. We might think of this as the price corporations pay for being allowed to absorb risk for their stakeholders.
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